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ABSTRACT 
 
The use of government fiscal stimulus to support the economy in the recent economic crisis has 
brought increases in government deficits and increased government debt. This has produced an 
interest in sustainable government debt and the role of deficits in the economy. This paper argues 
in favor of a concept of “responsible” government policy, referring to positions held by Franklin 
and Marshall Professor Will Lyons. The idea is that government should be responsible to the 
needs and desires of its citizens, but that this should go beyond physical security and education, 
to economic security. Building on the fallacy of composition and misplaced concreteness, it 
suggests that in an integrated macro system an increased desire to save on the part of the private 
sector will be self-defeating unless the government acts in a responsible manner to support those 
desires. This can only be done by government dissaving via an expenditure deficit. The 
outstanding government debt simply represents the desires of the public to hold safe financial 
assets, and can only be unsustainable if the public’s desires change. The government should 
always be responsive to these desires, and adjust its expenditure policy. 
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SOME PERSONAL REMINISCENCES 
 
I will start by reminiscing about my experience as a graduate student in the 1960s. I entered 
Rutgers University in January of 1966. This was the period of the Cambridge Capital and 
Growth controversies that pitted Cambridge, MA (MIT) against Cambridge, England. Virtually 
every week a new article was circulating pointing out logical errors in the other side’s reasoning. 
What Shackle called “the Years of High Theory.” As graduate students, we watched the battle 
with the same interest as a close-run pennant race.  
So you can imagine the excitement when it was announced that Paul Samuelson, the 
captain of the MIT side, was to come to Rutgers to present a Graduate Seminar! We were sure 
we would witness another salvo in the battle of the giants. And you can also imagine the 
disappointment when Samuelson announced that his talk was going to address the major 
economic problem on the minds of the average citizen: government deficit spending! This was 
the spring of 1966. The deficit for the year would come out to a massive 1/2 of 1 percent and 
government debt in the hands of the public was below 35 percent of GDP!  
Recall that this was the period after John Kennedy’s highly successful election campaign 
that was based on the “Dual gaps”: the missile gap with the Soviet Union and the “GDP gap.” 
While the former turned out to be fictitious (the CIA was no better at counting missiles than 
weapons of mass destruction) the latter was dealt with after Kennedy’s death (and after the gap 
had also been more less closed) by the tax cuts engineered by Walter Heller as head of the 
Council of Economic Advisers in the Revenue Act of 1964. Of course, we now know that by 
1966 the official figures hid a substantial amount of off-budget expenditures for the conflict in 
Southeast Asia. 
Thus chapter one of the Report of the Council of Economic Advisers was entitled 
“Approaching Full Employment,” while chapter two dealt with “The Outlook for Cost-price 
Stability.” The unemployment rate in 1965 had nearly reached 4 percent and inflation was below 
2 percent. Wage and price guideposts that had been notionally in place since the stagflation of 
the late 1950s were reinstated: a simple incomes policy in which hourly wages were to keep step 
with average productivity and prices to mirror labor costs at constant markups. Vietnam is 
referred to in the Report, but only to argue that the economy’s exceptional performance was not 
a result of war expenditures, estimated interesting enough at a half a percent of GDP—the same   3
figure as the deficit! Of course, it was this exceptional growth and employment performance that 
kept the deficit at extremely low levels, and that allowed the ratio of outstanding debt to decline.  
I bring up this episode, not because it represents an example of successful fiscal policy—
as you will recall it very quickly came to ruin as the war expenditures distorted expenditure 
figures and brought demand well above full employment, with rising inflation and external 
imbalances that broadly discredited Keynesian fine-tuning policies—but rather because it 
indicates the confusion in popular opinion concerning the operation of government fiscal policy. 
Despite the clear success of the policy (and notwithstanding Ken Galbraith’s insistence that 
direct government expenditures would have been preferable to tax increases), Samuelson argued 
that public opinion was still concerned with the size of the deficit and debt.  
Today we are again witnessing public opinion that is less and less supportive of the 
current government’s stimulus policies despite the fact that they have provided a floor under 
what could have been a collapse in income and employment similar to that of the 1930s. Not 
only have critics argued that the policy has not worked, since unemployment has continued to 
rise after its introduction, the administration seems to have accepted the idea that current levels 
of the deficit and debt as a share of GDP are excessive. Recall that the current deficit for 
2009/2010 is around 10 percent and the ratio of debt to GDP is in the range of 60 percent—
figures in the mid-range of postwar U.S. experience, but at the low end of the range for a war 
economy. 
This raises the question that I want to discuss: what constitutes “fiscal responsibility” on 
the part of the government and on the part of economists? And to whom should the government 
be responsible in the design of its tax and expenditure policy? These are crucial issues because 
getting the answer wrong has enormous consequences—in 1966 the failure to reign in policy laid 
the ground work for the inflation that brought the stagflation of the oil crisis, and today a failure 
to recognize the need for additional stimulus may mean periods of prolonged unemployment for 
the eight million or so Americans who have been the major casualty of the current crisis. 
 
SOME ERUDITE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Answering this question in the twenty-first century is more difficult than it might have been in 
the seventeenth or eighteenth century. Basically this is because modern economics treats the   4
economic role of government as an afterthought or an appendage to the analysis of the 
characteristics of the behavior of the private sector in a free market economy. Consider the 
standard macroeconomic textbook. It opens with a model of two aggregate agents, households 
and firms, who undertake decisions on how to maximize intertemporal consumption streams 
given expected incomes and decisions on how to maximize intertemporal profits by investing in 
capacity to produce those consumption streams. All of this takes place without any formal role 
for government or any explicit role for external trade or foreign capital flows. At best households 
recognize that their disposable income will depend on taxation and return on investments may 
depend on foreign competition, but there is no introduction of the decision-making process of 
either the government or the foreign sector.  
This gets the historical and logical order of things exactly backwards. It is difficult to find 
a country that existed without a sovereign ruler and some form of government long before the 
existence of a private-property-based market economy. Indeed many of these pre-Hellenic 
societies were matriarchies! In addition, most economies were built on their exploitation of 
foreign trade long before they built up any sort of private market for consumer goods or engaged 
in investment in manufacturing. The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and even England built their 
economic power on the exploitation of foreign lands through foreign trading companies. In 
general, the sovereign exercised close control over any domestic market activity. In fact, the first 
exchange markets were held in public places on stipulated dates at the pleasure of the Sovereign 
precisely because of the fear that commercial activities would allow the accumulation of private 
wealth to challenge the power of the landed aristocracy that supported the Sovereign.  
The transition from the periodic public markets to bilateral exchange in private markets 
(the botteghe oscure) is detailed in Braudel’s monumental Civilization and Capitalism. But it 
took a sustained propaganda effort to elevate the commercial trader and the private market to the 
respectability of the landed aristocracy, not to mention manufacturing. The classic literary 
reference here is Tommaso de Lampedusa’s Il Gattopardo—given cinematic reality by Burt 
Lancaster.  
For economists, the locus classicus of this public relations effort was Bernard de 
Mandeville’s famous Fable of the Bees, lauding the public benefits of private vices. It is 
interesting to note that here it is the unintended benefits that arise from profligate spenders   5
following their private market vices in comparison to the néfaste consequences of parsimonious 
savers.   
“The Root of evil, Avarice, 
That damn’d ill-natur’d baneful Vice, 
Was Slave to Prodigality, 
That Noble Sin; whilst Luxury 
Employ’d a Million of the Poor, 
And odious Pride a Million more. 
Envy itself, and Vanity 
Were Ministers of Industry” 
 
But, there was a clear role of government in this process of justifying the benefits of the market: 
 
“So Vice is beneficial found,  
When it’s by Justice lopt and bound; 
Nay, where the People would be great, 
As necessary to the State, 
As Hunger is to make ‘em eat. 
Bare Vertue can’t make Nations live 
In Splendour; they, that would revive 
A Golden Age, must be as free, 
For Acorns, as for Honesty.” 
 
It is thus clear that Mandeville’s ideas went well beyond the simplistic formula: private vices = 
public virtues. Instead, selfish market behavior might lead to collective good, but only if those in 
government could channel the different passions at the root of human action in the direction of 
public benefit. It is thus that “Private Vices by the dextrous Management of a skilful Politician 
may be turned into Publick Benefits.”  
Mandeville adopted this position in order to criticize those who preached the benefits of 
traditional values of parsimony and circumspection, idealized as a society in which individuals 
could live a virtuous life in harmony as they pursued truth and beauty. In contrast he supported a 
larger-scale commercial society based on the division of labor and technical progress that would 
allow per capita incomes to grow more rapidly.  
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“shall have no Arts or Sciences, or be quiet longer than their 
Neighbours will let them; they must be poor, ignorant, and 
almost wholly destitute of what we call the Comforts of Life, and 
all the Cardinal Virtues together won’t so much as procure a 
tolerable Coat or a Porridge-Pot among them: For in this State of 
slothful Ease and stupid Innocence, as you need not fear great 
Vices, so you must not expect any considerable Virtues. Man 
never exerts himself but when he is rous’d by his Desires.” 
 
 
  It is the large mercantile society, in which the behavior of men is driven by individualistic 
motivations, that favors the progress of wealth and with it the very enrichment of human 
personality. Together with laws, education and the very fact of being accustomed to community 
life were important, since through them the different passions may be directed towards the 
collective good. In a sense, the interplay of well-balanced passions constituted a sort of “invisible 
hand” that guaranteed the progress of society, even if this was not the immediate objective of 
individual actions. This invisible hand was not, however, a necessary result of individual actions: 
it was itself a conscious construction, through which the abilities of those responsible for 
governing society manifested themselves. 
The opposition between these rival interpretations of society was raised in Albert 
Hirschman’s book, The Passions and the Interests. In a subsequent article he noted “the 
favorable side effects that the emerging economic system was imaginatively but confidently 
expected to have, with respect to both the character of citizens and the characteristics of 
statecraft. …particularly the … expectation … that the expansion of the market would restrain 
the arbitrary actions and excessive power plays of the sovereign, both in domestic and in 
international politics.”  
Since this approach is based on the presumption that the private market provides better 
solutions because it reflects individuals’ interests, the role of government is limited to those 
actions which structure private vices in such a way that they produce “public benefits.” This is 
the approach of Mandeville, as well as Adam Smith and the Classical schools of economists, as 
Lionel Robbins and Warren Samuels have persuasively argued. This approach limits the role of 
government to what are now termed “market-failures,” that is those cases where government 
regulation cannot channel private vices to produce public benefits, or those cases in which 
externalities create conditions in which exclusion of benefits is impossible so that private vices 
or market provision would be impossible. These are what have now been termed pure public   7
goods. Within this rather limited category, Adam Smith, the supposed champion of the market, 
managed to find justification for government action in  
 
“public agencies, in stamping cloth and conducting assay tests on 
precious metals, to ensure that they have been inspected for 
quality, that it should manage the currency and coinage, run the 
post office and in general supervise markets and contract-making 
through an independent judiciary, and provide wholly or in part a 
national education system—and make a start on dealing in 
palliative care with ‘obnoxious diseases’ like leprosy. All this, 
plus ‘facilitating commerce’ by public works.” 
 
 
Hirschman pursues the problems surrounding the modern activities of government by 
quoting Fred Hirsch (p. 128): “With macromanagement, Keynesian or otherwise, assuming an 
important role in the functioning of the system, the macromanagers must be motivated by ‘the 
general interest’ rather than by their self-interest, and the system, being based on self-interest, 
has no way of generating the proper motivation…”  
Here is the source of difficulty with the definition of responsible government fiscal policy 
when the government is presumed to be an economic actor itself. Consider the powers that the 
U.S. Constitution attributes to congress in Section 8–Powers of Congress: 
 
“The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but 
all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States; To borrow money on the credit of the United 
States; To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; To establish … 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
United States; To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of 
foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; To 
provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and 
current Coin of the United States.”  
 
 
All of these powers presume the role of the Federal government acting through a 
representative and democratically elected Congress as an economic actor. Indeed, all it does is to 
recognize the powers that were vested in the Sovereign under nondemocratic governments and 
restricts them to the democratic representatives of the electorate, rather than to the President to   8
ensure that that office not take on royal privilege (or at least until the Bush-Cheney 
Administration). The Constitution further ensures that these powers shall not reside in the 
individual states in Section 10, Powers Prohibited of States: 
 
“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; 
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of 
Credit
1; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in 
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, 




In undertaking these activities, especially the activities of taxation and borrowing, the 
government clearly has an impact on the way private vices will be channeled to contribute to the 
public benefit. The question is how best to do this? Should government undertake the “Bare 
Vertues that can’t make nations live?” Or should it become a “Slave to Prodigality” to take the 
extreme version representing deficit spending? It is interesting that it is the former position that 
has become dominant. Government should be frugal not prodigal. That economists have come to 
accept the idea, not only that the private household should be run on the basis of frugality, but 
that the “public household” should be so managed, is clearly a departure from the historical 
debate that was meant to justify the benefits of the market economy.  
 
SOME SIMPLE PHILOSOPHY 
 
Now, it seems obvious that this approach not only contradicts this long Classical tradition, but 
that it suffers from two major fallacies. The unintended consequences of human actions, so well 
put in Mandeville’s fable, finds its modern form in the fallacy of composition: what is true of the 
actions of a single individual need not be true of all individuals. The frugality of individual 
households need not translate into frugality for the aggregate of households. 
The second is my favorite philosophic fallacy of misplaced concreteness: to mistakenly 
consider the aggregate result of the decisions of actual entities as a final reality capable of 
independent conscious action. This is also often called anthropomorphism, the attribution of 
                                                            
1 A bill of credit is some sort of paper medium by which value is exchanged between the government and 
individuals. Money is a bill of credit, but a bill of credit need not be money. An interest-bearing certificate that was 
issued by Missouri and usable in the payment of taxes was thus ruled to be an unconstitutional bill of credit.   9
human characteristics to something that is clearly not human; thus, the assumption that the 
“government” should act in the same way as a human household. This is a fallacy that pervades 
much of aggregate economics since the transformation of Keynes’s General Theory into 
macroeconomics based on economic aggregates that are presumed to have discoverable 
behaviors of their own. For example, the determination of aggregate consumption by means of 
the identification of the aggregate propensity to consume. This is a point that has been stressed 
by Austrian economists, and has been at the basis of the idea of a “microfoundation” of 
macroeconomics. Unfortunately, it is a remedy to a fallacy! 
Thus, when we are told that the government should arrange its affairs in the same way a 
virtuous family would do by operating a fiscal policy that generates a budget surplus, this is a 
clear contradiction of the Classical role of government in ensuring that private vices produce 
public benefits. But, it also commits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, for it attributes to an 
aggregate of actual political entities a final reality in which it is considered to act as if it were a 
single individual. The major contribution of public-choice theory and other works in this area 
such as that of Mancur Olsen, is to point out that individuals compose these political entities and 
there is no reason to believe that they should not act in their own self-interest, which may not be 
that of the polity. The error here lies in the presumption that there was no political organization 
that would, in Mandeville’s terms, channel these interests to the public welfare. 
A similar argument is applied to the existence of government debt resulting from a 
prodigal fiscal policy. Here it is argued that the restitution of the debt will place a burden on 
“future generations” or more precisely our grandchildren (note that the interests of celibates are 
conveniently left out of account). Here, too, we find the fallacy of creating a concrete final entity 
in the form of an anthropomorphic “future” generation that will have to repay the debt prodigally 
created by its ancestors. But, even if the future generation could be appropriately defined, it 
would have to engage Doc Brown to allow Marty McFly to go “back to the future” to make the 
required payments on behalf of the prodigal grandparents. If the debt is incurred today, but it is 
to be resolved in the future, the future resources to pay off the debt would have to be transmitted 
back to the present in order for there to be any burden in terms of lost consumption by the future 
generation! If it cannot be time-transmitted then it stays in the future, unless our grandchildren 
decide to engage in a gigantic potlatch and burn the resources and declare the debt to be 
extinguished.   10
It is perhaps easier to understand the argument in a different way, following Jevons 
dictum that in economics “bygones are forever bygones.” This idea was original developed to 
debunk the idea that costs of production determine value on the grounds that selling price will be 
determined by present market conditions, irrespective of the costs that may have been borne in 
the past to produce the goods. If prices are set in the market today, then whatever happened in 
the past is irrelevant. 
The same is true of national output. Irrespective of the size of the existing debt burden on 
future generations, consumption in the future will be determined by national income in the 
future. Our grandchildren can consume neither more nor less than future income irrespective of 
the size of the inherited debt. This is not to say that the existence of debt will not have any 
impact. Clearly if the debt has caused national income to be higher than it might have been, then 
future income will be higher than it might have been. This is clearly not a burden. This was 
precisely Mandeville’s point.  
The existence of debt will also have an impact on the distribution of future national 
income with debt holders having a larger claim than nonowners. If this has an impact on demand 
there may be an impact on income, but it is not in the form of a burden that has to be paid across 
generations. It all takes place within the same cohort of the population, and in the aggregate 
Abba Lerner’s aphorism holds good. For the nonowners: IOU, for the owners UO Me. Since the 
two sides must be equal IOU=UO Me solves out to U=Me. There is no net impact on the size of 
future income in the aggregate, only on its distribution. 
Thus, the argument that prudent household management should provide the exemplar for 
good government management errs in attributing to government a final reality that is not present.  
 
SOME SIMPLE ACCOUNTING THAT IS NOT BORING 
 
This brings us to the impact that the prodigal government’s deficit will have on national income. 
This used to be a relatively straightforward proposition based on the existence of a positive 
Keynesian employment multiplier. All this has now somewhat surprisingly been called into 
question. Thus, it is necessary to go back to first principles to look at the argument that lies 
behind the multiplier and the implications of the fallacy of composition.   11
We are all familiar with the circular flow of income. This idea antedates the concept of 
the multiplier and can be found in books written during the 1920s, such as Foster and Catchings’ 
Money.
2 In simple terms, the circular flow is a diagrammatic representation of flow of funds 
accounts showing the sources and uses of funds for various sectors of the economy. Households 
have credits (sources of funds) that consist of wage incomes they receive from firms that employ 
them and the sales of other services. For firms these same flows appear as debits (uses of funds) 
representing the costs of labor and other inputs used to produce output. Households have debits 
represented by their expenditures on the goods and services they buy from firms, while these 
expenditures show up in firms’ credits representing the sales of their output to households.  
Now if a virtuous household is one that saves—that is, that has more credits than debits 
in its flow of funds account—by the law of double entry this means that firms will have debits 
that are greater than their credits. In other words, its sales do not cover costs and it makes losses. 
Thus, household saving corresponds to firms’ losses (or “dissaving”) in a consistent flow of fund 
accounting framework. But, we have simply rediscovered Mandeville’s law of unintended 
consequences. Virtue in the form of household saving leads to firms’ losses and bankruptcy, loss 
of employment, loss of household incomes, and a decreased ability to save. 
We might find a way out of this accounting constraint if there is a banking system which 
would lend to firms to cover their losses by borrowing the savings of the households. But, this is 
a Catch-22 situation, sometimes called a Ponzi scheme. If households ever decide to dissave by 
seeking to call in their loans, the firms will be unable to pay and have to declare bankruptcy. No 
real saving would in fact have taken place, since the savings cannot be converted into any other 
good or asset and would only cause loss of incomes. Thus, in a market-based economy firms can 
only exist over time if they make profits, that is, they have to save. But this implies that 
households must be dissaving. This is just a reversal of the Catch-22 since households cannot 
dissave without borrowing and they will not be able to repay these debts, for if they try to do so 
firms profits will disappear and households will lose their incomes.  
                                                            
2 In 1922, Foster published an account of the circuit flow of money in the American Economic Review which 
included a diagram of the circuit of money flowing in one direction and goods flowing in the opposite direction. The 
idea was to keep the economy running smoothly by matching consumer income, thus money to spend, with the 
amount of goods available for sale. Foster apparently adapted the circuit flow of money diagram from a statistician, 
but the diagram was originated (as far as we know) by an amateur economist, Nicolas Johanssen, around the turn of 
the century.    12
Now the traditional escape from this Catch-22 dilemma caused by unintended 
consequences (or the fallacy of composition) is to introduce an autonomous source of demand 
for firms’ output and a source of household expenditures: autonomous investment. Investment 
expenditures provide household wage incomes without increasing consumption goods output for 
sale to households and workers in the investment sector buy consumption goods that they do not 
produce. Thus, if the amount that households desire to save is just the amount that firms decide 
to invest, it is possible for both households and firms to be virtuous, for households can save and 
firms can make profits by investing in additional capacity, leaving both able to satisfy their 
intended expenditure plans. Formally, household credits are the wages and other sales for the 
production of consumption and investment goods output while their debits are their expenditures 
on consumption goods, the difference representing a balancing debit: saving. For firms their 
credits are the sale of consumption goods and their debits are costs of production of consumption 
goods and the purchase of investment goods. The difference is a credit: borrowing from 
households to finance the investment.  
However, note that this is only possible when there is an exact coincidence of savings and 
investment intentions. Households intend to save the same portion of their incomes as the 
proportion of national income that firms intend to invest. The problems arise when there is an 
imbalance between firms’ and households’ intentions to save. What happens if households want 
to save more than firms want to invest? If firms’ sales fall short of output, there is excess 
capacity created by the investment and firms will cut back on future investment as well as cut 
back on current employment. The same result, unintended consequences of a decision to save 
leads to lower incomes and thus lower savings. Households are unable to achieve their intended 
savings. Here the result is not bankruptcy, but either an unsustainable expansion and inflation or 
a collapse of output and employment that has no natural limit. Again, the market is functioning 
appropriately in response to the signals that are being received by firms and households, only it 
is not capable of coordinating savings and investment decisions. There is an aggregate constraint 
on individual actions that no individual can influence.  
Solving this failure of the market to coordinate independent decisions of households and 
firms requires an agent that is not bound by pure market principles and budget constraints. This 
is where the objectives of government fiscal policy become important. If government is to 
behave as any other market participant, falling output will mean falling tax receipts and a rising   13
deficit. If the response is to apply the principles of virtue, the reaction should be to increase taxes 
or reduce expenditures. But, this simply reinforces the market-generated disequilibrium—
producing a bigger boom and inflation or a bigger recession and loss of employment. More 
importantly, the government is making it more difficult here for private agents to achieve their 
intentions. Is the government’s objective of frugality more important that those of its citizens? 
Answering this question will determine the responsibility of its fiscal policy: to balance its own 
accounts, or to act in order to allow the private sector to achieve its objectives. 
 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT FISCAL POLICY: VALIDATING PRIVATE SECTOR 
DECISIONS 
 
If the government acts not as a self-interested individual, but in order to allow citizens to achieve 
their intended expenditure decisions, it must engage in policies that support private sector 
decisions in such a way that they lead to public good. It should act to coordinate and offset the 
incompatible combination of firms’ and households’ intentions. If households follow the rule of 
virtue and seek to save too much, then the government should run a fiscal deficit that is just 
equal to the shortfall between households’ desires to save and firms’ expectations of profits. By 
doing so it can allow each individual to achieve his desired objective. But, it also avoids the loss 
in income that would result from the mismatch. Here the government can intervene to make 
private vices into public virtue by encouraging prodigality when the private sector desires to be 
frugal. Government prodigality is the equivalent of supporting public virtue! This is the fiscal 
policy of a responsible government, responsible to insure that private sector decisions can be 
achieved rather thwarted by the law of unintended consequences.
3 
 
FLOWS OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND JOBS 
It is important to note that the action of government here is to influence the budget constraint or 
the size of the credits of both households and firms by creating a sufficiently large debit in its 
flow of funds account. It is important to note here that there is no guarantee this will have any 
                                                            
3 Nota bene: the proposition is reversible: if the private sector desires to save too little, then the government must run 
a surplus—a prodigal private sector required a frugal government.    14
particular impact on the level of employment. That is a question of technology and on the 
balance sheets of households and firms. Let us focus on the balance sheet aspect. 
Whenever an economic unit has a flow of funds account imbalance it will build up stocks 
of assets or liabilities. As seen above, when households intended savings are excessive compared 
to the intentions of firms, they had to lend to firms. This creates a number of asset and liability 
balance-sheet entries. Firms had to issue liabilities. If they borrowed from a bank, the bank 
records an asset. If the bank borrowed from households then it has a liability that is matched by a 
household asset. In this case the loans were just financing losses and only had value as long as 
households continued to save and lend. They did not represent the creation of any real 
purchasing power. This is another aspect of Jevons’s law: bygones are forever bygones. Once the 
money was lent there was no guarantee it would be reimbursed at any particular value.  
What if households had been planning to use their savings to finance their retirement 
consumption? It is likely that the discovery that their savings had no real value would lead to a 
change in intended savings behavior. Households would reduce their consumption so that 
government dissaving would have to increase in order to validate these intentions and maintain 
current levels of output. In this case, an increase in the government deficit would simply go to 
replace the lost expected purchasing power of the household savings and avoid an additional 
decline in output and profits. The positive impact on employment would be minimal; it would 
just prevent a loss of income and employment. It is for this reason there is no strict connection 
between government deficits and employment. 
This is similar to what is happening currently, only with one substantial difference. The 
first is that instead of experiencing a goods’ price inflation, the economy went through asset 
price inflation. Instead of dissaving and borrowing to buy current output for current 
consumption, households bought assets, in particular houses. Now, a goods’ price inflation 
generally tends to be dampened by policy, but in modern times they are hardly ever reversed. In 
the postwar period we have had short periods of deflation, but never a sustained period of falling 
goods prices. Thus, the impact of a goods’ price inflation is usually felt in the flow of funds 
accounts. Prices go up, which has an impact on the debits of households and the credits of firms, 
and if they are followed by an adjustment in wages to meet cost of living increases there is also 
an adjustment on the credits of households and the debits of firms. Depending on the lag between 
the two, firms may be better off for awhile until households’ incomes catch up, but on average   15
over time balance is maintained, which is why it is so difficult to bring a wage price spiral to a 
halt. Someone will be on the losing side when the stabilization of prices takes place. 
On the other hand, asset prices may both increase and decline for substantial periods of 
time. If assets are financed by borrowing they have a peculiar impact on balance sheets. This is 
because the liabilities that finance assets are not at all flexible. There is no average balancing out 
as in a goods’ inflation. When a firm’s debits are greater than its credits on the flow of funds 
account it may be facing a liquidity shortage, which it seeks to finance by borrowing or selling 
assets or reducing expenditures. When a household loses employment it means that its credits on 
the flow of funds account fall below its debits and it has to cut expenditures. This, of course, 
makes firms less liquid and leads to further declines in employment.  
As the size of dissaving in firms rises this will eventually lead to a fall in the return on its 
assets and thus a fall in the price of its assets below the liabilities used to finance them. At this 
point it becomes insolvent and is required to declare bankruptcy. This creates a negative 
feedback on flow of funds accounts for households. When a household’s assets, such as its 
house, fall below the outstanding mortgage liability it is insolvent, as the sale of the house could 
not extinguish the debt. Here the response is either default, which places even greater pressure on 
house prices, or an attempt to build up other assets, for example by reducing dissaving or 
increasing desired savings. 
The economy is currently facing disequilibrium in both sets of accounts that are feeding 
off each other. We could characterize current economic conditions as a flow of funds 
disequilibrium because both households and firms have intentions to increase their savings to 
meet declining credits (sources of funds). The decline in output and employment has meant that 
some households no longer have any credits aside from unemployment insurance. In addition, 
there is the balance-sheet disequilibrium in which the value of firms’ and households’ assets 
have fallen below the liabilities that finance them. This leads to default, bankruptcy, or attempts 
to generate other credits by increasing savings intentions. Finally, since the households have 
financed their assets with liabilities, namely mortgages financed by financial institutions, these 
institutions also face conditions in which their assets have a lower value than their liabilities and 
they are seeking to build up credits. It is the law of accounting that not all of the components of 
the private sector can be increasing their credits at the same time to repair the insolvency on their   16
balance sheets. This can only be done if the government creates a debit position through a deficit 
that is equal to the desired increase in credits of the private sector.  
 
RESPONSIBLE FISCAL POLICY IN THE CURRENT ECONOMY 
 
How is a responsible government to respond to these needs of its citizens to increase their 
credits? To channel private vices into public benefits? The largest imbalances are in the 
households’ balance sheets and in their flow of funds accounts. To meet these disequilibria 
would require government dissaving of an equivalent amount. However, what the government 
did was to move first to meet the disequilibrium in the banks’ balance sheets and only 
subsequently to deal with the problems of households’ balance sheets. And this was done 
indirectly, through the stimulus bill which provided for an increase in total income credits, but 
not necessarily those with balance-sheet imbalances. While this helps households overall, it was 
insufficient to meet the balance-sheet disequilibrium, given the increasing flow of funds 
disequilibrium created by falling employment levels. Thus, firms continued to adjust by reducing 
output and employment; despite a near $800 billion stimulus package, unemployment continued 
to rise.  
This has caused some to argue that this means that the policy was mistaken. But, as seen 
above, in conditions of balance-sheet disequilibrium there is no clear rule on the impact of 
spending on employment. Indeed, the correct answer is that the best policy would have been 
direct operations on balance sheets and flows of funds. What might this have looked like? First, 
the support given to banks could have been linked to equivalent relief given by banks to 
households through renegotiation of the value of their mortgage liabilities. Banks were given 
support to allow them to write down the value of their assets invested in housing, the counterpart 
to these assets are households’ mortgage liabilities. They could have been written down at the 
same time. Remember the basic difficulty in balance-sheet disequilibrium is due to the fact that 
asset prices move, but liabilities do not. 
Next, the government could have had a direct impact on flows of funds of households by 
ensuring that they had a minimum credit position through a government guaranteed employment 
program. This would have set a floor under household incomes and prevented the excessive 
savings intentions brought about by the crisis. These income support programs have been   17
experimented with in a number of countries and would have provided a backstop to the decline 
in asset values. 
This leaves the question of the size of the government deficit required to do this and the 
impact on outstanding debt. It is estimated that from $12–17 trillion has now been committed to 
support the financial system. The size of the subprime mortgage market was never more than $2 
or 3 trillion. Direct intervention would have been much cheaper. 
Government EMPLOYMENT guarantee programs, which would imply an income and an 
employment floor to the flow of funds accounts, have been costed at around 1 percent of national 
income. Again, much less than is currently being spent in the governments’ stimulus package. 
The cost of a responsible government policy would certainly not have been large and would have 
been less than current policies.  
But what would have been the impact on overall government debt? As seen in the flow of 
funds accounts, the debits on government flows of funds emerge as credits on the accounts of 
households and firms. Remember U = Me? They offset balance-sheet losses or support flow of 
funds, all of which generate credits on government account. Even more important is the fact that 
the government cannot default on its debt. It does not have to raise dollars from the private sector 
in order to finance any of its expenditures, and thus it need not do so to repay debt. 
Thus, in current conditions in which households, firms, and financial institutions are 
seeking to increase saving, it would be irresponsible for government to attempt to run deficits 
and reduce the outstanding indebtedness.
4 Were it to do so it would simply drive more firms to 
balance-sheet insolvency and flow of funds illiquidity. It would only drive more households into 
unemployment and balance-sheet insolvency and default, increasing the decline in asset prices. It 
was such irresponsible fiscal policy that produced the Great Depression. A responsible 
government would not let this happen again.  
                                                            
4 Of course such a policy would be responsible if the private sector were seeking in aggregate to dissave. But this is 
unlikely to be the case until household and firms have rebuilt their balance sheets and the value of their assets.   18
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